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I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid developments in digital technology over the past quarter cen-
tury have made it easier than ever for people to create and instantly share
content.  These developments have served as the basis for countless inno-
vations and have spawned some of today’s largest and most profitable
companies.  As content creation and distribution continues to evolve, busi-
nesses seek new ways to profit from these technological innovations.  But
while businesses continue to develop around new methods of content dis-
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tribution, the law of copyright, which generally aims to encourage the cre-
ation of content, has been slow to adapt.1  This era of modern
technological innovation thus operates in a legal environment developed
primarily in the 1970s.  Consequently, many innovative and groundbreak-
ing ideas are stymied by legal conceptions that seem out of date in cyber-
space.  The result is excessive legal liability and disproportionate
ramifications on innovation.
No company illustrates this dilemma more than Napster.  Napster’s
peer-to-peer file sharing technology fundamentally disrupted the music in-
dustry when it debuted in 1999.2  In 2000, lawsuits started pouring in. Nap-
ster was ultimately found liable for copyright infringement,3 which put the
company out of business.4  The ultimate ruling against Napster, A&M
Records v. Napster, illustrates a disconnect between innovation and copy-
right law.  A recent study, citing conversations with hundreds of startups,
explained that “[a]s the curation and distribution of creative content be-
comes an increasingly ripe source of innovation, old-fashioned notions of
what it means to make a copy—and how infringement of copyright is en-
forced—lead to many potentially great business models being blocked.”5
Investors are hesitant to get involved in business models likely to im-
plicate legal liability.  Napster illustrates this as well: after Napster, innova-
tion in the digital music area was severely affected by the fear of excessive
liability.6  At the time, the fallout from Napster was described as a “waste-
land” in investment and thereby in innovation in digital music.7  A recent
survey found that even today many venture capital firms refuse to invest in
digital music due to fears of potential liability.8  In the past, however, in-
vestors’ fears over investing in ventures with potentially illegal business
models had little to do with concerns about direct copyright infringement
liability; investors were afraid of losing their investments, not about being
1. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (“Copyright laws have struggled through the years
to keep pace with emerging technology. . . .”).
2. Clyde Haberman, Grappling With the ‘Culture of Free’ in Napster’s Aftermath,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/technology/grappling-with-the
-culture-of-free-in-napsters-aftermath.html.
3. See generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. See David Kravets, Napster Trial Ends Seven Years Later, Defining Online Sharing
Along the Way, WIRED (Aug. 31, 2007, 5:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/2007/08/napster-trial-
e.
5. Edward Lee, Copyright-Exempt Nonprofits: A Simple Proposal to Spur Innova-
tion, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1433, 1441 (quoting Jeff Lynn, Copyright for Growth, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INNOVATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR 21ST CENTURY GROWTH AND JOBS 11, 14
(Ian Hargreaves & Paul Hofheinz eds., 2012)).
6. Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 WIS. L.
REV. 891, 905–06 (2012).
7. Id. at 916.
8. Id. at 954.
Spring 2015] Avoiding the Next Napster 263
held liable themselves.9  Today, such complacence about derivative liabil-
ity is misguided.
Two contemporary developments show that investing in digital content
distribution can implicate copyright infringement liability on the part of
investors.  First, there has been tremendous growth in the number of social
media ventures dependent on user-generated content, raising unique and
significant copyright infringement issues.  Second, recent legal decisions
have left the issue of investor liability for the indirect copyright infringe-
ment of the ventures in which they invest conspicuously unclear.  Without
legal clarity, investing in social media will remain risky and innovation in
the area could consequently suffer.  The potential ramifications of statu-
tory damages for copyright infringement liability are huge; if even a single
court finds an investor secondarily liable for copyright infringement, inno-
vation in social media could take a huge hit.  However, investors should
not step back.  By adequately identifying, valuing, and negotiating around
potential liability, investors can safely navigate this uncertain legal land-
scape to promote activity and innovation.
This Note addresses the potential liability of investors in ventures with
business models dependent on user-generated content, explores the
ramifications of liability, and offers guidance to encourage continued in-
vestment in this area.  This Note focuses specifically on Venture Capital
firms and their individual investors (VCs) and Early Stage Ventures
(ESVs) in the social media area.  Part I describes the business landscape
that has led to the explosion of user-generated content and a new breed of
startup.  Part II describes the law of secondary liability and the precedent
for investor liability.  Part III describes how the contractual relationship
between VCs and ESVs can implicate secondary liability and how VCs
should adjust negotiations to minimize liability.
II. THE BUSINESS LANDSCAPE
A. The Rise of User-Generated Content
Over the past decade, numerous technological, business, and cultural
developments have led to the incredible rise of User-Generated Content
(UGC) as a means of expression online.10  While there is no widely ac-
cepted definition of UGC,11 a very basic definition, from the American
Bar Association’s Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industry, is
9. See 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS,
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS § 9.2 (2d ed. 2015) (“Apart from a few isolated
decisions or special fact situations generally involving lenders, it has as yet not been popular
to impose liability, beyond the investment made, on investors. . . .”).
10. See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 6.18
(3d ed. 2013).
11. Len Glickman & Jessica Fingerhut, User-Generated Content: Recent Developments
in Canada and the United States, ENTM’T. & SPORTS LAW. (ABA Forum on the Entm’t &
Sports Indus., Chicago, Ill.), Nov. 2012, at 3.
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“material uploaded to the Internet by website users.”12  UGC can be in
the form of text (such as blogs13, microblogs14, or user reviews15), images
(such as photographs16 or videos17), or a combination thereof.18  Largely
due to the rise of social media, which makes it easier than ever for users to
create and share content online, UGC has become the basis for some of
the largest and fastest-growing companies in the United States.19  Ven-
tures with business models significantly dependent on UGC, so-called Dig-
ital Content Intermediaries (DCIs), allow users to upload, distribute, and
search UGC content.20  DCIs do not themselves distribute content but in-
stead provide the means for users to distribute content.21  YouTube,
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Vine, and Pinterest are examples of DCIs,
all of which handle vast quantities of UGC.22
The explosion of UGC has fundamentally transformed the Internet
and in turn the media and technology industries.  Len Glickman and Jes-
sica Fingerhut neatly summarize the magnitude of UGC that DCIs deal
with:
Two of the most visited websites on the Internet, Facebook and YouTube, are
sites devoted to UGC.  According to Facebook, which had one billion active
users as of October 2012, every day more than 300 million photos are
uploaded to the site . . . .  In 2011, YouTube had more than one trillion views,
and 72 hours of video are uploaded to the site each minute. More than half of
the videos uploaded to YouTube have been rated or commented on by users,
and more than 700 YouTube videos are shared on Twitter each minute.  Twit-
ter has become increasingly more popular with more than 140 million active
users. According to Twitter, there are over 340 million “tweets” (posts
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., WORDPRESS, http://www.wordpress.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
14. See, e.g., TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
15. See, e.g., YELP, http://www.yelp.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
16. See, e.g., INSTAGRAM, http://www.instagram.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
17. See, e.g., YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2015).
18. Glickman & Fingerhut, supra note 11, at 3.
19. See Frank Bell, The Rise of User-Generated Content, ENTREPRENEUR (Aug. 26,
2007), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/183432 (“Most of the fastest-growing sites on the
internet are based on user-generated content.”); see also Robert P. Latham et al., Legal Im-
plications of User-Generated Content: YouTube, MySpace, Facebook, 20 No. 5 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (“[P]ublication of user-generated content . . . has exploded. Many business
and government entities, including the vast majority of traditional media companies, have
developed frameworks to facilitate the distribution of content by end users.”).
20. MATTHEW LE MERLE, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF U.S. INTERNET COPYRIGHT REGU-
LATIONS ON EARLY-STAGE INVESTMENT: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY 14 (2011).
21. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckon-
ing the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L.
REV. 577, 578 (2008).
22. STUART L. GASNER & MELISSA J. MIKSCH, KEKER & VAN NEST LLP, ANGEL
INVESTORS: SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR DCI COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, available at http://
www.kvn.com/Templates/media/files/PDfs/VCExperts_Angel%20Investors-%20Secondary
%20Liability%20for%20DCI%20Copyright%20Infringement.pdf.
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uploaded to Twitter) created per day. Wikipedia, ranked as the sixth most
visited website, provides access to over 18 million UGC articles in 279
languages.23
The incredible size and scope of UGC and its implications for innovation
in the media and technology industries has given rise to a new wave of
entrepreneurs, who are attempting to extract value from the popularity of
UGC in new and innovative ways.24  Even existing companies with busi-
ness models not primarily dependent on UGC have found ways to incor-
porate UGC into their business models.25
The popularity of UGC has greatly contributed to recent deal activity
among DCIs.  2012 through 2015 were record years for social media trans-
actions.26  Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp, Twitter’s
acquisition of Vine, Microsoft’s acquisition of Yammer, and Yahoo’s ac-
quisition of Tumblr all occurred in that period, accounting for over $24
billion in deal activity.27  The size and prevalence of these deals speaks not
only to the confidence in UGC-based business models, but also to their
penetration across various sectors.28  As the industry matures, business
opportunities are only expected to increase.29
B. The Prospect of Liability
The rise of UGC raises significant concerns regarding the potential
copyright infringement liability of DCIs.30  Content managed by DCIs is
23. Glickman & Fingerhut, supra note 11, at 4 (internal citations omitted).
24. Id.
25. See id. (“Integrating customer product reviews into their website designs is another
way companies utilize UGC. User reviews can be in the form of simple text or, as Ama-
zon.com has done, by uploading user-generated videos . . . A number of companies use UGC
in their advertising campaigns, a practice which enhances brand loyalty by enabling consum-
ers to express their ideas and enthusiasm about products.”); see also Jack Marshall, Meet
PetFlow, The Retailer that Hatched a Media Business, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2014, 2:31 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/11/14/meet-petflow-the-retailer-that-hatched-a-media-business
(explaining how PetFlow, an online retailer, started a company blog as a marketing tactic
featuring pet-themed UGC, which ultimately attracted more than 20 million unique users a
month and was spun off into a separate media business which helps drives traffic back to the
retail site).
26. Conner Forrest, The Top 7 Acquisitions of All-Time in Social Media, and Why
They Matter, TECHREPUBLIC (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:33 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/
the-top-7-acquisitions-of-all-time-in-social-media-and-why-they-matter/.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Jessica Luterman Naeve, This Year, Social M&A Will Venture Into the
Enterprise, ADEXCHANGER (Jan. 17, 2013), http://adexchanger.com/data-driven-thinking/
70169/
29. See Press Release, BDO, Tech CFOs Project Surge in Revenue – BDO Survey
(Feb. 2015), available at https://www.bdo.com/insights/industries/press-releases/tech-cfos-pro
ject-surge-in-revenue.
30. See DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 10.
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often material owned by third parties.31  Thus, DCIs often facilitate the
dissemination of potentially infringing material.32  The amount of UGC
distribution online makes claims of copyright infringement more commer-
cially relevant than ever.33  Further, the most effective of these types of
copyright infringement claims are not directed at the users uploading con-
tent, but rather at the companies that provide the means for such activity,
including their founders and investors.34  As Lital Helman explains:
As a strategic decision, the fight is conducted not only against copyright in-
fringers themselves, but also against the providers of various types of technol-
ogies that make such infringement possible. . . . The common thread among
these lawsuits is that the defendants themselves have not engaged in any copy-
right infringement. Rather, infringing conduct of others—users of the defend-
ants’ technology—is the basis of the claims.35
UGC-associated liability can be a huge burden on DCIs, and even the
threat of a lawsuit can effectively shut down young ventures.36  As ex-
plained by Michael Carrier, this tactic is especially effective against star-
tups because “expensive” and “demoralizing” lawsuits “ ‘distract the
companies . . . [and] have an ‘absolute chilling effect,’ with their ultimate
success . . . completely irrelevant.”37
The threat of liability is not only expensive and distracting for DCIs; it
can also chill investment because investors do not want to fund any ven-
ture facing the likelihood of expensive litigation.38  If investors fear claims
for statutory damages, they will be less willing to invest because, given the
huge potential downside of infringement liability, few investments will be
worth the risk.39  A recent survey of VCs and angel investors showed that
31. See Michael Lasky & Joseph Lewczak, User-generated Content Can Be Risky,
PRWEEK (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.dglaw.com/images_user/newsalerts/Lasky
PRWeek.pdf.
32. See DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 10; see also Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 578.
33. See Martin B. Robins, Intellectual Property and Information Technology Due Dili-
gence in Mergers and Acquisitions: A More Substantive Approach Needed, 2008 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 321, 341.
34. Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 578; see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese,
Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV.
1345, 1379 (“Suits against third parties in the digital environment do not— indeed generally
cannot—address specific conduct by particular end users. Suits against facilitators premised
on individual cases of infringement would pose the same economic problem for copyright
owners as suits against the individual infringers themselves. Rather, the class of suits we
consider in this Article involves efforts to shut down a facilitator entirely or to require modi-
fication in the way the facilitator operates.”).
35. Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability
of Technology Providers For Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 112
(2010).
36. Carrier, supra note 6, at 938.
37. Id. at 936–37.
38. See id. at 938.
39. Lee, supra note 5, at 1441–42. See also Timothy Wiseman, Limiting Innovation
Through Willful Blindness, 14 NEV. L.J. 201, 224 (2013) (“Investors are naturally leery of
investing in small companies with a high likelihood of being sued.”).
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“[i]ncreasing liability for [DCIs] would have a greater negative impact on
early-stage investments than would a weak economy and an increased
competitive environment.”40  This was the case after Napster, when music
labels became more aggressive with litigation and venture capital funding
of digital music startups declined significantly.41  VCs are vital to startups,
but if personal liability is even a possibility, the specter of statutory dam-
ages will chill investment in DCIs.42
To the extent that potential liability chills investment, it also chills in-
novation.43  Early stage investing is critical to the future creation and
growth of new companies that are creating new and innovative products
and technologies.44  Once the money dries up, it becomes “harder to find
experienced entrepreneurs . . . who are willing to start a company in this
space, which le[ads] to the loss of new disruptive technologies that deliver
content to people.”45  The massive and continuing growth of UGC means
the ramifications of liability are greater than ever and underscores the im-
portance of understanding the scope of liability.
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Copyright Infringement Liability Generally
The owner of a copyright in a work maintains six exclusive rights: (i) to
reproduce the work; (ii) to create derivative works based upon the original
work; (iii) to distribute copies of the work; (iv) to publicly perform the
work; (v) to display the work; and (vi) to digitally transmit the work.46  If a
third party exercises any of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights without
permission, it is liable as a direct infringer.47  A copyright owner who
prevails against a direct infringer is entitled to choose between an award of
actual damages or statutory damages.48  Actual damages are compensa-
tory; they entitle an aggrieved plaintiff to lost license fees, profits or royal-
40. LE MERLE ET AL., supra note 20, at 6.
41. Carrier, supra note 6, at 916.
42. See Lee, supra note 5, at 1440 (“The threat of massive copyright lawsuits deters
venture capitalists and angel investors from investing in New internet platform even before
they get off the ground.”); see also LE MERLE ET AL., supra note 20, at 11 (“Given the key
role that angels and VCs play, not only in funding new companies but also in working with
them to promote their success, their continued willingness to invest is critical to the future
creation and growth of new companies.”).
43. See Lemley, supra note 34, at 1349 (“The key policy point is that going after mak-
ers of technology for the uses to which their technologies may be put threatens to stifle
innovation. Similarly, going after necessary third parties like investors and law firms will stifle
investment in innovation.”).
44. See LE MERLE ET AL., supra note 20, at 11.
45. Carrier, supra note 6, at 954.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2013).
47. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][1]
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (2014).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2013).
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ties.49  Statutory damages, as the name implies, are stipulated via statute
and fall along a sliding scale, entitling an aggrieved plaintiff to anywhere in
the range of $200 to $150,000 per work infringed.50  Because actual dam-
ages account for lost licensing fees and profits, they will generally be
higher in cases where a single protected work is infringed numerous
times.51  Statutory damages, on the other hand, can dwarf actual damages
when a defendant infringes many separate protected works.52
For defendants facing claims of UGC-associated infringement, statu-
tory damages can be crippling.53  Some defendants have even described
statutory damages for copyright infringement as “effectively infinite.”54
When Viacom sued YouTube and Google for copyright infringement, esti-
mated statutory damages reached as high as $24 billion, nearly 15 times
what Google paid to acquire YouTube.55  SONICBlue, the creator of one
of the first DVR systems, faced statutory damages arguably as high as
more than one trillion dollars due to the aggregation of copies needed to
work their DVR software for thousands of users.56  Such staggering statu-
tory damages awards can bankrupt even the largest companies, and in turn
encourage hefty settlements, such as when Grooveshark paid $50 million
to Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Music
Group to avoid statutory damages of up to $736 million.57
B. Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability
Copyright infringement liability is not limited to the direct infringer.
So-called secondary liability arises when a third party assists or is responsi-
49. Jason R. Bush, De-Mystifying Damages for Copyright Infringement, THE MISSIS-
SIPPI LAWYER, Summer 2012, at 8, available at http://www.bakerdonelson.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/Summer_2012_pdf.
50. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 47, at § 14.04[B][1][b].
51. See, e.g., Alex Stedman, ‘Blurred Lines’ Jury Orders Pharrell, Robin Thicke to Pay
$7.3 Million to Marvin Gaye Family, VARIETY (Mar. 10, 2015), http://variety.com/2015/music/
news/blurred-lines-verdict-pharrell-robin-thicke-ordered-to-pay-7-3-million-to-marvin-gaye-
family-1201450117 (noting that the jury verdict entitling Marvin Gaye’s family to $7.3 million
was the result of a claim for actual damages).
52. See, e.g., Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting De-
fendant-Appellee at 14-16, Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487
(2011) (Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052).
53. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 825 (3d ed.
2010).
54. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 941.
55. Id. at 940.
56. Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-
Appellee at 14-16, Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (2011)
(Nos. 10-1883, 10-1947, 10-2052).
57. Bill Donahue, Grooveshark’s Copyright Settlement With Labels Cost It $50M,
LAW360 (May 1, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/media/articles/650768?nl_pk=cfe
3124c-1adb-47b9-8e57-9d3322681654&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=media.
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ble for the acts of a direct infringer.58  The extension of direct liability to a
third party does not stem from the Copyright Act;59 secondary liability
doctrines emerged from the common law principles of agency and respon-
deat superior.60  There are numerous justifications for extending copyright
infringement liability beyond direct infringers.  First, it makes sense to im-
pose liability on a party that may not be a direct infringer but otherwise
played a significant role in the infringing act.61  Similarly, secondary liabil-
ity is necessary to extend the reach of damages to a defendant who both
profited off of direct infringement and is more able to pay up, especially
considering that direct infringers are often judgment-proof.62
Vicarious liability is one form of secondary liability.  Under the theory
of vicarious liability, a third party may be held liable for the acts of a direct
infringer over whom they have a certain degree of authority.63  Vicarious
liability is based in agency law and thus arises most often in the employer/
employee context, but is not limited to this area.  Contributory liability is a
second form of secondary liability.  Contributory liability exists when one
party knowingly facilitates direct infringement.64  Contributory liability is
based in tort law and, in the language of the Ninth Circuit, “stems from the
notion that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should
be held accountable.”65  Despite the differences between vicarious and
contributory liability, it is not uncommon for a defendant to be held liable
for both types of indirect infringement.66
A claim of vicarious liability has two elements: (i) the right and ability
of a defendant to supervise infringing conduct and (ii) a direct financial
interest in that conduct.67  The classic vicarious infringement case is Sha-
piro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co.  In Shapiro, a storeowner rented
out his space to concessionaires.  The storeowner was ultimately found lia-
bility for the infringing acts of a concessionaire over whom he had “the
ultimate right of supervision” and through which he received “a propor-
tionate share of the gross receipts” from the infringing activity.68  The
right and ability to supervise means that, to be found vicariously liable, a
defendant must have both the legal right and practical ability to stop or
limit the directly infringing conduct and must have failed to do so.69  Nor-
58. See Arista Records v. Lime Group, 784 F. Supp. 2d. 398, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
59. See Luvdarts v. AT&T Mobility, 710 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2013).
60. See id.
61. See Arista, 784 F. Supp. at 422.
62. Helman, supra note 35, at 158-60.
63. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 476.
64. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
65. Id.
66. COHEN, supra note 53, at 476.
67. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
68. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308.
69. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Arista Records v. Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d. 398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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mally, “legal right” implies some form of contractual or employment rela-
tionship between the direct and indirect infringers.70  A direct financial
interest exists where there is a causal relationship between infringing activ-
ity and a financial benefit.71  A defendant profiting from direct infringe-
ment would constitute such a connection, as would the ability to attract
new customers.72
The elements of contributory infringement are (i) knowledge and (ii)
facilitation of direct infringement.73  The knowledge element requires that
a defendant know or have reason to know of direct infringement.74  Ac-
tual or constructive knowledge is sufficient, but something more than
“generalized” knowledge of a “possibility” of infringement is necessary.75
The facilitation element is satisfied when there is a substantial amount of
participation in the infringing activity.76  “Participation” can mean induc-
ing, encouraging, causing or materially contributing to infringing activity.77
The Ninth Circuit has described the test of facilitation as whether “the
defendant engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the in-
fringement.”78  In one particularly expansive interpretation of the facilita-
tion test, the same court found a swap meet operator contributorily liable
for renting out booth space to vendors who were directly liable for copy-
right infringement.79
The tests of vicarious and contributory liability are not dependent on
the literal proximity between the direct and indirect infringers.80  In other
words, secondary liability can extend beyond scenarios where there is a
direct relationship between the defendant and the primary infringer.81
The requirements of right and ability to supervise, direct financial interest,
knowledge, and facilitation certainly imply a close connection between the
70. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1173.
71. See Arista, 784 F. Supp. at 435.
72. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308 (“By reserving for itself a proportionate share of the gross
receipts from [direct infringer’s] sales of phonograph records, [defendant] had a most definite
financial interest . . . .”). See also MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005); Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 816 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (equating
profiting with “tak[ing] a cut of virtually every sale”).
73. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
74. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001).
75. See id. at 1020–21 (arguing that conclusory allegations of specific knowledge were
insufficient to support the knowledge prong); see also Luvdarts v. AT&T Mobility, 710 F.3d
1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).
76. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
77. Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also Luvdarts, 710 F.3d at 1071.
78. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
79. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–63 (9th Cir. 1996).
80. Benjamin H. Glatstein, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1605, 1605
(2004).
81. See id. at 1611.
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direct infringer and the third party defendant, and traditional applications
of those requirements reflect that understanding of the elements.82  How-
ever, in cyberspace, the same requirements of secondary liability can be
satisfied in situations where the real-world relationship between a direct
and secondary infringer is more tenuous.83  One judge on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit justified extending liability to tangentially
related parties by reasoning that secondary liability turns on “how signifi-
cantly [their] activity helps infringement, not on whether it’s characterized
as one step or two steps removed from it.”84
This application of secondary liability has sometimes been labeled “ter-
tiary liability.”  In the context of copyright infringement, tertiary liability
represents secondary liability that is applied to seemingly tertiary parties:
parties who assist secondary infringers.85  However, tertiary liability as a
doctrine distinct from other forms of secondary liability has no support in
case law.86  Still, to the extent that tertiary liability stands for the proposi-
tion that direct infringement has the ability to flow down the chain of rela-
tionships to reach tangentially involved parties such as investors, it is a
relevant and appropriate label.87  Investor liability is, of course, contingent
on the secondary liability of portfolio companies, so to the extent that an
investor assists a DCI that is itself secondarily liable, tertiary liability sug-
gests that direct liability can extend down the chain to investors.
C. Secondary Liability for Digital Content Intermediaries
Traditional conceptions of secondary liability have evolved in the mod-
ern information economy, and courts have struggled to apply the tests to
new, complex relationships that exist in cyberspace.  For example, in Relig-
ious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California distinguished the operator of an online bulletin board from a
landlord for purposes of the knowledge prong of contributory liability.  It
argued that a system operator “does not completely relinquish control”
upon engaging with the direct infringer, but rather actively and continu-
ously provides its services.88  Thus, “the relevant time frame for knowl-
82. See Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 580 (“In the early cases, the relationship between
the supplier and the user of the means was sufficiently close that there could be little doubt of
either the knowledge or the nexus between the means and the infringement.”).
83. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (allowing a claim of secondary liability to move forward against a
defendant accused of being liable for the direct infringement of a subscriber to an online
bulletin board).
84. Visa, 494 F.3d at 812 (Kozinski, A., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Glatstein, supra note 80, at 1605, 1610.
86. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C 00-1369 MHP, 2001 WL
36593841, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2001) (holding that a claim of tertiary liability was unsup-
ported by any precedent).
87. See Glatstein, supra note 80, at 1618.
88. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
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edge is not when Netcom entered into an agreement with [the direct
infringer].  It should be [during the period] when Netcom provided its ser-
vices to allow [the direct infringer] to infringe.”89 Netcom thus stands for
the proposition that, to the extent DCIs have an ongoing service relation-
ship with their users, there is a lower threshold in cyberspace to satisfy the
knowledge prong of contributory liability.
Similarly, in Perfect 10 v. Visa, the Ninth Circuit grappled with how the
facilitation prong of contributory liability applied to a search engine that
provided links to infringing material as compared to an online payment
processor that facilitated payment transactions related to infringing mate-
rial.90  The court distinguished the two by arguing that “helping users to
locate an image might substantially assist users to download infringing
images, but processing payments does not.”91  The court reasoned that
there was a “direct connection” between a search engine and the distribu-
tion of infringing content.92  The payment processer, on the other hand,
was too peripherally involved and therefore did not materially contribute
to the infringing conduct.93  Similar reasoning was applied to the right and
ability to supervise element of vicarious liability.  Visa, in the view of the
court, was too far removed from the infringing activity to have the requi-
site amount of control over it.  The only allegation was that Visa could
“take certain steps that may have the indirect effect of reducing infringing
activity on the Internet,” which did not constitute the requisite ability to
control the infringing activity.94  The court further reasoned that “mere
ability to withdraw a financial ‘carrot’ does not create the ‘stick’ of ‘right
and ability to control’ that vicarious infringement requires.”95
If a search engine has a direct connection to the distribution of mate-
rial, then a DCI certainly does as well.  Much like in the search engine
context, there is a contractual relationship between a DCI, its users, and
the infringing content to the extent that users agree to terms of use in
exchange for the ability to post and search UGC. This direct relationship
forms the basis for new applications of traditional secondary liability tests.
For example, the knowledge element of contributory liability is easier to
satisfy when DCIs have notice systems in place to alert them of infringing
material.  Moreover, due to their ongoing relationship with the infringing
activity, DCIs are assumed to be able to take simple steps to prevent fur-
ther infringement upon notice of infringing activity.96  Failure to do so
89. Id. at 1374.
90. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2007).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 796.
93. See id. at 800; see also Arista Records v. Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d. 398, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
94. Visa, 494 F.3d at 803.
95. Id.
96. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that not completely relinquishing control over how its sys-
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would likely constitute both facilitation for purposes of contributory liabil-
ity97 as well as the right and ability to supervise for purposes of vicarious
liability.98  The relationship of DCIs to infringing activity also creates a
multitude of profit vehicles.99  Therefore, the requirement of a direct fi-
nancial interest for purposes of vicarious liability is loosened, and courts
have found that element satisfied even where a DCI was only potentially
profitable100 or merely had the ability to attract infringing users.101
D. DCIs and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
What the summary above does not address is that the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) largely renders the issue of secondary liabil-
ity moot for DCIs.  Section 512 of the DMCA establishes safe harbors for
Online Service Providers (OSPs) and provides immunity from infringe-
ment in exchange for compliance with a set of statutory requirements.102
In enacting the DMCA, Congress specifically aimed to address the issue of
DCI secondary liability for copyright infringement.103  Importantly, the
DMCA does not alter or reinterpret traditional notions of secondary lia-
bility.  Instead:
[without] imply[ing] that a service provider is or is not liable as an infringer
either for conduct that qualifies for a limitation of liability or for conduct that
fails to qualify[,] . . . the limitations of liability apply if the provider is found to
be liable under existing principles of law . . . [and] protect [them] from liability
for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious or contributory infringement.104
The DMCA thus acts as a shield against liability, but only for entities that
fall within its scope.
The DMCA exclusively covers OSPs, and the degree to which its safe
harbors extend to third parties is unclear.105  Therefore, while the DMCA
tem is used is unlike a landlord, and implies being able to take simple measure to prevent
further damage to P’s copyrighted works).
97. See id. at 1374 (pointing out that failure to stop infringing conduct from being
distributed constitutes substantial participation).
98. See Arista Records v. Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d. 398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“De-
fendant had the ability to supervise . . . and failed to do so . . . evidence includes ability to.”);
see also MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster . . . [had] the ability to locate infringing
material listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users access to the system.”).
99. See Helman, supra note 35, at 116–17.
100. See id.
101. See Arista, 784 F. Supp. 2d. at 435.
102. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 19 (1998).
103. S. REP. NO. 105-190, supra note 1, at 8 (“[B]y limiting the liability of service prov-
iders, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that
the variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to expand.”).
104. Id. at 17.
105. See John Blevins, Uncertainty as Enforcement Mechanism: The New Expansion of
Secondary Copyright Liability to Internet Platforms, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1821, 1855 (2013)
(“[O]ne concern is that investors facing personal liability suits have significantly less protec-
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may be a viable defense for the DCIs, infringement liability may still ex-
tend further down the chain to parties such as investors.106  The US Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently declined to specifically rule on
this issue, but did note that extending secondary liability to investors of a
venture that was protected by the DMCA would undermine Congress’
purpose in passing the DMCA.107  Yet, the justifications for allowing a
safe harbor for OSPs do not easily extend to their investors.  One of the
underlying reasons for giving OSPs voluntary safe harbors was because of
their inability to sufficiently allocate the risk of potential liability.108  In-
vestors, however, are in a much better position to transactionally maneu-
ver around liability and can obtain insurance and indemnification from the
OSPs to insulate themselves.  Also, in exchange for safe harbor protection,
OSPs voluntarily comply with a variety of statutory requirements.109
Their investors are not part of this quid pro quo, however, and therefore
may not be able to reap the benefits of the safe harbors.110  Thus, the
DMCA is not a panacea for investors in DCIs.
Similarly, just as OSPs and their investors should be evaluated sepa-
rately for purposes of the DMCA safe harbors, they should be evaluated
separately for the purposes of the secondary liability tests.  The elements
of knowledge, financial interest, facilitation, and right and ability to super-
vise may sometimes be attributable solely to the DCI in question, but they
also may be attributable to parties with whom the DCIs interact.  In cer-
tain circumstances, DCIs may look less like actors and more like mere
instrumentalities of third parties who pull the strings and reap the benefits.
In such a case, it does not make sense to evaluate DCIs and their investors
on the same spectrum of liability.  To the extent that DCI investors are
independently satisfying the secondary infringement tests, it is justifiable
for courts to continue to hold them liable while allowing their portfolio
company to benefit from the DMCA safe harbors.
tion than the Internet platforms themselves. Because individual investors are not ‘service
providers,” they cannot invoke the DMCA safe harbors.”).
106. See Gasner & Misch, supra note 22.
107. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1031 n.20
(9th Cir. 2013) (“We remain concerned about the possibility of imposing secondary liability
on tangentially involved parties, like Visa and the Investor Defendants, while those accused
of direct infringement receive safe harbor protection. ‘[B]y limiting the liability of service
providers,’ the DMCA sought to assuage any ‘hesitat[ion] to make the necessary investment
in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet.’ Congress was no doubt well
aware that service providers can make the desired investment only if they receive funding
from investors like the Investor Defendants. Although we do not decide the matter today,
were we to hold that Veoh was protected, but its investors were not, investors might hesitate
to provide the necessary funding to companies like Veoh, and Congress’ purpose in passing
the DMCA would be undermined.”).
108. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 503.
109. See generally 17 U.S.C. §512.
110. One could argue that to the extent investors have enough control to be deemed
secondarily liable, they likely controlled the decision to comply with the DMCA safe harbor
tests.
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E. Extending Secondary Liability to Investors
 Because investors cannot rely on the DMCA for protection, they must be
especially cautious about the extent to which they can be found seconda-
rily liable for copyright infringement.  Unfortunately, the law of investor
liability for secondary copyright infringement is unsettled and still devel-
oping.111  The prospect for investor liability has increased significantly
over the past 15 years, beginning with the adaptation of secondary liability
to parent companies for the acts of their subsidiaries.112  The relationship
between an investor and a debtor is not unlike that of a parent and a
subsidiary corporation: parent companies have a similarly complicated re-
lationship that mixes an economic interest with a control interest.  Much
like the relationship between a landlord and tenant, there is an assumption
that the acts of a parent are “intimately associated” with that of the sub-
sidiary.113  The Ninth Circuit has held that a parent corporation can be
held liable for the infringing acts of its subsidiary if there is a “substantial
and continuing connection between the two with respect to infringing
acts.”114
A parent cannot be held vicariously liable for the infringing acts of its
subsidiary simply by nature of the legal relationship between the two.115
It must be shown, in the words of one court, that a parent “has a direct
financial interest in the infringing activity and that the parent has the right
and ability to supervise the subsidiary, which is evidenced by some contin-
uing connection between the two in regard to the infringing activity.”116
In Banff v. Limited, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York held that a parent of a retail clothing store did not exercise sufficient
control over the subsidiary to be vicariously liable for the latter’s direct
infringement because the subsidiary made its own day-to-day decisions
linked to the infringement and because the parent had no “continuing con-
nection” with the activities or people involved in the alleged
infringement.117
As Banff illustrates, “control” forms the basis of applying secondary
liability to investors, but courts grapple both with what control actually
means, and how much control is sufficient to implicate liability.  Two re-
cent cases that specifically addressed the issue of investor liability illustrate
this.  The first is UMG v. Bertelsmann, which directly stemmed out of the
Napster litigation.118  Plaintiffs UMG Recordings, Capitol Records, and
111. Gasner & Miksch, supra note 22.
112. See, e.g., Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
113. Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 1103, 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
114. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1553 (9th Cir.
1989)
115. Banff, 869 F. Supp at 1110.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. UMG Recordings v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 409 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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Jerry Lieber, argued that Bertelsmann AG and the Venture Capital firm
Hummer Winblad were contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright
infringement through their relationship with Napster.119  The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants “exercise[ed] full control” over Napster and
that, with full knowledge of infringing activities, supported Napster and
even ordered the infringing activities to continue.120  The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss, but the court allowed the claims to move forward.
However, the court never evaluated the claim of “control” on the merits:
Bertelsmann and Hummer Winblad settled the case, and Bertelsmann
agreed to pay approximately $60 million.121  Thus, while Bertelsman
stands for the proposition that an allegation of investor having “control”
over a venture’s infringing activity constitutes a “viable claim for relief
under theories of both contributory and vicarious liability,”122 it leaves the
question of what actually constitutes “control” conspicuously unclear.
A more recent case further addressed the extent to which an investor
has the requisite amount of control to satisfy a secondary liability claim.123
UMG v. Shelter Capital Partners stemmed from an action by UMG Re-
cordings against Veoh Networks, a video sharing website similar to You-
Tube.124  In the original action, UMG added three investors as defendants
alongside Veoh.125  On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Veoh appealed the
district court’s dismissal of its cause of action against the investors.126  The
Ninth Circuit allowed the claims against the investors to move forward
despite the fact that Veoh itself would have been able to avoid liability
through the DMCA safe harbor.127  On remand, the district court came
down on the side of the investors on both claims of secondary liability.
Addressing both contributory and vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit
found that the three investors did not together have the requisite amount
of control over Veoh.128  Distinguishing Bertelsmann, where the investor
in question was Napster’s “only available source of funding,” no single
investor individually controlled Veoh.129  The court rejected the theory
that the three investors “together took control of Veoh’s operations” by
occupying a majority of the Board’s seats because there was no allegation
119. Id.
120. Id. at 413.
121. John Ottaviani, The End is Near –Bertelsmann Settles EMI Claims Over Napster,
TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Mar. 28, 2007), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/03/
the_end_is_near.htm.
122. UMG Recordings v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 414 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
123. See generally UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th
Cir. 2011).
124. Id. at 1011.
125. Id. at 1013
126. Id. at 1011.
127. Id. at 1011.
128. Id. at 1032.
129. Id.
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that the three investors “agree[d] to operate as a unified entity to obtain
and leverage majority control.”130  Without such an allegation, the court
feared the ability for a plaintiff to sue “any collection of directors making
up 51% of the board on the theory that they constitute a majority.”131
Shelter Capital Partners thus shows that control of the board alone is not
sufficient to constitute control for purposes of secondary liability.
The takeaway from Banff, Bertelsmann and Shelter Capital Partners is
that the distinction between “legal” and “practical” control is essential to
defining the scope of investor liability.  Practical control is an issue of fact.
In Banff, practical control was implied by the parent/subsidiary arrange-
ment; in Shelter Capital Partners, board control constituted practical con-
trol.  Less clear is the point at which practical control constitutes legal
control.  This fine line has enormous ramifications, because where practi-
cal control constitutes legal control, liability exists.
F. Painting the Picture of Investor Liability
Bertelsmann and Shelter Capital Partners establish the potential for in-
vestor liability, and show that liability hinges on the issue of legal control.
This means that all the elements of secondary liability—the right and abil-
ity to supervise, a direct financial interest, knowledge and facilitation—
ultimately boil down to the macro-issue of control. Therefore, to fully
evaluate the scope of investor control we must look to the traditional tests
of secondary liability.  Combined with Bertelsmann and Shelter Capital
Partners, a roadmap for assessing investor liability emerges.
i. Contributory Liability
The elements of contributory liability are knowledge and facilitation.
Either actual or constructive knowledge can form the basis of contributory
infringement liability for an investor.132  Knowledge can exist in the form
of a copyright holder giving notice of infringement to investors,133 or can
be implied from investors’ communications to ventures.134  To find con-
structive knowledge, courts look to the sophistication of an investor with
regards to the venture or technology with which they are working.135  For
example, in Napster, the District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia held that Napster had “constructive knowledge because its execu-
tives, who had recording industry experience and had previously enforced
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Arista Records v. Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d. 398, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
133. Thomas B. Foley, Show Me The Money!: Third-Party Copyright Infringement Lia-
bility Reaches Investors & Lenders, 38 SW. L. REV. 89, 114 (2008).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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IP rights, downloaded copyrighted songs and promoted the website with
screen shots listing infringing files.”136
Facilitation boils down to some form of material assistance in accom-
plishing infringement.137  Thus, the difference between investors with very
little role in a venture and investors who lend with the expectation of a
significant control stake is particularly salient in a contributory liability
analysis.138  As Scott D. Baker and Emily B. Kirsch explain, investors be-
come especially vulnerable when they “exercise enough control over the
business or strategic operations of [their] debtor to be considered to be
supervising, inducing, causing or materially contributing to an infringing
activity of its debtor[.]”139  Funding can help establish a claim of material
assistance, but funding alone is not enough.140  Instead, funding must be
coupled with some other form of action, such as authority over how such
funding is spent.141  This type of authority will sometimes be implied, such
as when the funding in question is from the only available source, as was
the case in Bertelsmann.142  However, Shelter Capital Partners teaches that
solely a majority board or voting stake will not infer material assistance
without it being attributable to a single investor or a group of investors
acting in concert.143
ii. Vicarious Liability
The elements of vicarious liability are the right and ability to supervise
and a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.  The right and abil-
ity to supervise element can be tricky for investors to navigate, but tradi-
tionally exists when a defendant “has both a legal right to stop or limit the
directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so.”144  A
contractual relationship, for example, constitutes a legal right to act, but
perhaps not a practical one.145  Thus, until a contractual right is exercised,
the right and ability to supervise may not exist.146  Like the facilitation
136. See A&M Records Inc. v. Napster Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
137. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1031–32 (9th
Cir. 2013).
138. See Scott D. Baker & Emily B. Kirsch, Does Lender Liability Exist for Copyright




140. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1032 (9th Cir.
2013). The Bertelsmann court had previously expressly declined to rule on this point. See
generally UMG Recordings v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
141. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1032.
142. Bertelsmann, 222 F.R.D. at 412.
143. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1032.
144. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 730 (9th Cir. 2007).
145. See Glatstein, supra note 80, at 1632.
146. See id.
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element of contributory liability, Shelter Capital Partners establishes that
the right and ability to supervise element of vicarious liability was not sat-
isfied when there was no allegation that investors “agreed to act in con-
cert, and thus together” exercised practical control.147
Of significant concern to investors is the direct financial interest prong
of vicarious liability.  This prong has traditionally been satisfied by evi-
dence of a direct economic benefit from the infringing activity.148  Thus,
under a traditional conception of financial interest, an investor’s propor-
tional share of the business would likely be considered a financial bene-
fit.149  However, where an investor’s return is independent of the
infringing activity, no direct financial benefit exists.150  As investment
structures become more complex, it is more difficult to find the direct
commercial benefit that existed in shares of gross revenues or profits from
an infringing business.151  Consider loans, for example.  A lender who gets
back nothing more than what he put in is not receiving a financial bene-
fit.152  One who charges an interest rate for a loan likely is receiving a
benefit,153 but the interest rate may arguably be deemed independent
from any infringing activity.
Things become even more complicated when we consider investment
structures such as convertible debt and warrants.  On the one hand, a war-
rant holder certainly derives a financial benefit to the extent that the in-
fringing activity increases the value of the venture.154  On the other hand,
there is arguably no financial benefit for a holder of convertible debt until
that debt is converted into equity.155  However, the terms of the converti-
ble note may be determinative: if the note’s conversion occurs at the dis-
cretion of the lender, then the note holder’s benefit begins to look more
like that of the warrant holder.156  Alternatively, if conversion is condi-
tioned upon certain business milestones that, in turn, are related to in-
fringing activity, then the note holder’s benefit would be directly linked to
that activity.  Thus, today the extent to which an investor receives a finan-
cial benefit sufficient to constitute vicarious liability is highly complex and
fact specific.
147. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1033 (emphasis added).
148. See Glatstein, supra note 80, at 1630.
149. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1376 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
150. See id.
151. See Foley, supra note 133, at 104 n.119.
152. See id. at 118–19.
153. See id. at 119–20.
154. See id. at 120–21.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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IV. INVESTOR PROTECTION
A. Implications of Liability
When making investment decisions, VCs are faced with two broad
types of economic risk: (i) the risk of losing their investment and (ii) the
risk of incurring liability that extends beyond that investment.157  To miti-
gate the first type of risk, VCs negotiate for control mechanisms to “add
value” to their portfolio companies and to hopefully earn a return.158
However, in exchange for these control mechanisms, VCs open them-
selves up to the second type of risk.159  In the world of copyright infringe-
ment, a small risk of liability may constitute an enormously
disproportionate cost.160  Investing in copyright infringement therefore
may constitute an insurmountable amount of monetary damages that
could deter future investment and significantly chill innovation.161
The lack of legal clarity with respect to investor liability for UGC has
both negative and positive implications in this regard.  On the one hand, it
means that VCs are especially vulnerable, given their tendency to be in-
volved in the strategic direction and operations of the venture162 and their
inability to safely rely on DMCA protection.163  On the other hand, VCs
can utilize what little precedent exists to help guide their conduct in a way
to both minimize the extent of practical control when it is unnecessary and
shield themselves from liability when practical control is desired.  VCs
should acknowledge the enhanced potential for liability by proactively al-
tering their investment conduct.  Specific case law regarding investor lia-
bility may be scant, but the traditional secondary liability tests provide
sufficient guidance for VC behavior.  In the interest of promoting innova-
tion and encouraging new DCIs, VCs should continue to invest in UGC-
based ventures.  VCs can safely invest in DCIs by taking various transac-
tional steps to protect themselves against liability.
B. Identifying and Pricing Potential Liability
The first step for investors in addressing expansive liability is to cor-
rectly identify and attempt to value such liability.  VCs should gain as
157. BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2 (“Venture capital investment is risky enough if all
that has been put at risk are the dollars invested in the enterprise. If, in addition, an investor
can be held liable to the creditors, and, indeed, to other investors, in an insolvent enterprise,
his risk parameters are undoubtedly exceeded.”).
158. Id. (“When raising money from his own investors—the limited partners in his ven-
ture pool—the professional manager of a venture capital partnership holds himself out as
someone with the expertise to “add value” to the investments under his control.”).
159. Id.
160. See Mitch Stoltz, To Safeguard the Public Domain (and the Public Interest), Fix
Copyright’s Crazy Penalties, DEEPLINKS BLOG (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2014/01/safeguard-public-domain-and-public-interest-fix-copyrights-crazy-penalties.
161. See BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2.
162. See Baker & Kirsch, supra note 138.
163. See infra Part II.D.
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much information about potential debtors’ relationships with intangible
assets and any potentially related liability.  The suggested protocols fall
under the broad umbrella of due diligence, with a special emphasis on
copyright infringement liability.164  The due diligence phase is the point at
which VCs dig deeper into their ventures’ materials to assess risk prior to
investing.165  Because of the heightened possibility of potential liability,
investors must be fully knowledgeable about the technology and business
models of their potential investments to fully understand the risks they are
undertaking and to cost-adjust appropriately.166  Simply put, the due dili-
gence process is about identifying risks that may implicate enormous statu-
tory damages claims.
Intellectual property due diligence is a crucial step for investors prior
to investing.167  This is especially true for investments in technology com-
panies, including DCIs.  Technology companies rely disproportionately on
intangible assets, whether their own or others’.  DCIs like Instagram and
Pinterest derive significant value from user-generated intangible assets,
even though they do not own those assets themselves.  The strategic im-
portance and complicated nature of intangible assets with DCIs makes
identifying and addressing the relevant risks even more important for po-
tential investors.168
The due diligence process is crucial to identifying and valuing any po-
tential liabilities, and the process prior to investments in DCIs should em-
phasize potential copyright infringement liability.169  Potential liability can
significantly affect the “value” of the transaction, which in the case of
164. See IPR HELPDESK, IP DUE DILIGENCE: ASSESSING VALUE AND RISKS OF IN-
TANGIBLES 1 (2012), available at https://www.iprhelpdesk.eu/sites/default/files/newsdocu-
ments/IP_due_diligence_0.pdf; see also Gasner & Miksch, supra note 22 (“While such due
diligence is valuable, another level of analysis may be warranted, focused on potential inves-
tor liability.”).
165. See BRAD FELD & JASON MENDELSON, VENTURE DEALS: BE SMARTER THAN
YOUR LAWYER AND VENTURE CAPITALIST 23, 26 (2d ed. 2012) (“[Due Diligence is] code for
‘I’m taking my exploration to the next level.”).
166. See Deborah A. Marshall et al., Derivative Liability for Copyright Infringement:
Napster, Grokster, Hummer Winblad and Bertelsmann, VC EXPERTS, https://vcexperts.com/
buzz_articles/364 (“Due diligence will be more critical than ever in making investment deci-
sions. Investors and entrepreneurs must arm themselves with a clear understanding of how
the technology is designed in order to understand the risks of infringement in the volatile
legal framework of pending cases, decided cases (and the questions they leave unanswered)
and potentially inconsistent decisions among the courts.”).
167. See id.
168. See Robins, supra note 33, at 344.  IP due diligence has also become a priority in
M&A deals, recently being described as “critical,” both in terms of priority and importance.
See Efrat Kasznik, Industry Report – IP Due Diligence in M&A Transactions: How to Avoid
Another Rolls Royce, IAM (May 21, 2014) http://www.iam-magazine.com/industryreports/
Detail.aspx?g=de977cd5-bdbc-437a-b568-44926d4bf239.
169. See DANIEL GLAZER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSET PURCHASES 2 (2001),
available at http://tech.friedfrank.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Marketing_TTG_PLC-IP-
Asset-Purchases_Glazer.pdf.
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early stage investments means the amount invested.170  Also, VCs should
expand due diligence procedures to include secondary liability con-
cerns.171 Shelter Capital Partners and Bertelsman do not give clear an-
swers, and so there is more pressure than ever on investors to make sure
they understand the full risks they are undertaking.172  Given the lack of
legal clarity in the area, even the threat of spurious claims should be taken
very seriously and priced accordingly.173
A thorough due diligence process for DCIs entails multiple steps.
First, a DCI’s user-generated intangible assets should be identified and
isolated from its own intangible assets.  Second, the income stream from
these intangible assets should be approximated.174  Next, the due diligence
process should identify and assess infringement exposure related to the
user-generated intangible assets.175  Any potential legal threats should be
thoroughly evaluated to address their merit and realistic chances for pro-
ceeding.176  For known and anticipated infringement claims, properly eval-
uating infringement exposure entails considering:
• the materiality of the dispute;
• best- and worst-case outcomes;
• the likelihood and expected cost of a settlement;
• past and future costs of the dispute;
• the ability to isolate the venture’s liability;177 and
• the possibility of business model alternatives.178
The next step in the due diligence process deals with future, or un-
known and unanticipated, infringement actions.  This involves evaluating
the venture’s internal compliance processes to establish the degree to
which it “minimize[s] the likelihood of involvement in disputes concerning
alleged infringement of third-party IP[.]”179  This step also involves inquir-
170. See Robins, supra note 33, at 324.
171. Gasner & Miksch, supra note 22 (“[B]roaden their legal due diligence to include
secondary liability issues.”).
172. See James L. Proctor, Jr., “Capital” Punishment: Evaluating an Investor’s Secon-
dary Copyright Infringement Liability after Veoh, 6 WASH J. L. TECH. & ARTS 217, 229
(2011).
173. See Robins, supra note 33, at 327.
174. See id.
175. Ethan Horwitz & Kandis Koustenis, A Guide To Conducting IP Due Diligence In
M&A, KING & SPALDING LLP (Jan. 7, 2014, 10:48 AM) http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/
KSPublic/library/publication/2014articles/1-7-14_Law360.pdf (“[I]dentify and evaluate all as-
sertions of copyright infringement . . . [.]”).
176. See Robins, supra note 33, at 327.
177. This step includes addressing indemnification, insurance, and other transactional
maneuvers discussed below.
178. See Glazer, supra note 169, at 7.
179. Robins, supra note 33, at 327.
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ing into the venture’s procedures for obtaining copyright clearance as well
as their compliance with the DMCA requirements.180
C. Avoiding Potential Liability
Once potential liability is identified and quantified, investors can take
a variety of affirmative steps to isolate it.  Boiled down to the most basic
level, investor liability is implicated by control.181  But because courts
have not specifically defined the parameters of control that will implicate
liability, it is difficult to correlate practical control with legal control.
Therefore, the best approach for isolating liability is for investors to mini-
mize the amount of practical control they have over a portfolio company,
both transactionally (through contract negotiations) and affirmatively
(through conduct).  Identifying potential liability is not meant to discour-
age investment, it is meant to allow investors to invest without fear of
potential liability.
When a VC formally decides to move forward with an investment, the
transaction is normally carried out through “a set of contracts.”182  These
transactions are private placements and therefore there is no public
database from which to glean their structures.183  However, numerous em-
pirical studies have shown that unlike other types of investors, VCs are not
passive investors and “often control or influence the decision to replace
the CEO and make other key business decisions.”184  The right to do this
comes from the VC as “someone with the expertise to ‘add value’ to the
investments under his control.’ ”185  While more recent empirical studies
have shown that the conception of the VC as insisting on outright control
exists only in a minority of cases, VCs still maintain a larger degree of
control over their investments than more traditional passive investors.186
The relationship between VCs and entrepreneurs is much like an
agency relationship.187  Through a variety of contractual mechanisms, VCs
protect themselves against opportunistic behavior by their portfolio com-
panies by giving themselves significant control rights.188  Control is not
achieved through day-to-day management decisions, but rather by moni-
toring business operations, creating contractual incentives, assisting in
strategic planning, maintaining veto rights, recruiting executives, negotiat-
180. Id. at 345; Horwitz & Koustenis, supra note 175 (“Evaluate the target company’s
procedures for obtaining copyright clearance . . . [.]”).
181. See infra Part II.E
182. D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 144 (1998).
183. William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corpo-
rate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 898 (2002).
184. Id. at 915.
185. BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2.
186. See Bratton, supra note 183, at 894; see also Smith, supra note 182, at 146–47.
187. Smith, supra note 182, at 138.
188. Id.
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ing employment contracts, assisting in additional financing, and influenc-
ing exit strategies.189  The VC/entrepreneur relationship is not purely an
agency relationship because it begins with a negotiation.190  However, in
many cases, and particularly in cases where a venture is a liability risk,
VCs have superior bargaining power.191  To the extent that VCs are able
to negotiate for a lopsided allocation of authority, they start to look like
the venture’s principal.192  Here, “control” means the various rights and
incentives that VCs contract for when negotiating financing with ventures
allowing them to affect business decisions.193  These are therefore the ele-
ments that need to be addressed to avoid legal liability.
i. Contractual Benefits and Control
Early-stage investors are concerned primarily with two things when ne-
gotiating a financing contract: economics and control.194  Economics and
control are precisely the same things that can implicate investors for in-
fringement liability.  The right and ability to supervise a portfolio company
is informed by how much control the VC negotiates for at the financing
stage.195  Similarly, the degree to which an investor facilitates a portfolio
company engaged in infringing activity, in addition to how much knowl-
edge they have about that activity, hinge largely on the amount of control
they have over the venture’s business model.196  The economics of a deal
not only help inform the extent of the financial benefit that an investor
receives, but also help inform the right and ability to supervise to the ex-
tent that financing is conditioned more or less on financing on certain ac-
tivities.197  The interrelationship between economics, control, and
secondary liability create a strong incentive on the part of investors to use
the financing negotiations phase to structure their rights and benefits in a
way that reduces their liability exposure while maximizing their business
objectives and interests.
ii. Economic Provisions
Investors maintain the most fundamental decisions associated with in-
vestor-venture relationships: whether to invest and how to invest.198  In-
189. Id. at 137–38, 140–42.
190. Id. at 139.
191. Bratton, supra note 183, at 897; see also BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2 (“The real
power the investor group has over a cash-poor corporation is economic, not legal.”).
192. Smith, supra note 182, at 137.
193. See id. at 141.
194. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 165, at 32.
195. See BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2.
196. See Baker & Kirsch, supra note 138.
197. See Smith, supra note 182, at 141 (“Venture capitalists exert substantial control
over the entrepreneur because of the staged financing that characterizes most venture capital
relationships.”).
198. See BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2.
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vestors can wield significant economic power over their ventures,
especially ESVs with little capital.199  Secondary liability can extend to in-
vestors through their economic relationships with ventures in two broad
ways.  One is the power of the purse: the affirmative decision to invest and
how much to invest.200  The second is through the contractual relationship:
the rights and benefits that are written into the financing documents.201
Thus, when investing in DCIs that are heavily dependent on UGC, inves-
tors should think about how the decision to invest and the structure of an
investment might implicate liability on their part.
Even simply the decision to invest may implicate liability for investors.
For example, a pre-money valuation communicated to a venture may im-
plicate knowledge of the venture’s liability.202  To the extent that a pre-
money valuation is based on a sophisticated look into the venture’s busi-
ness model and finances, it will arguably constitute constructive knowl-
edge of infringing activity.203  The decision to proceed with the investment
would likely implicate the facilitation prong of contributory liability to the
extent that the investment constitutes a “substantial participation” or en-
couragement in the infringing activity.204  Thus, perhaps a significantly in-
flated valuation or a very small equity stake would provide investor
protection to the extent that it would fail to constitute substantial partici-
pation or material facilitation.205
The structure of the security—whether it be preferred stock, converti-
ble debt, or otherwise—can also implicate liability.  For example, pre-
ferred stock entitles the investor to certain control rights designed to
protect the investor’s interests, such as preemptive rights.206  These con-
trol rights provide the investor leverage to approve major business deci-
sions and demand a board seat,207 thus giving them the right and ability to
supervise infringing activity.208  VCs should also structure their invest-
ments in ways that minimize the relationship between the infringing activ-
ity and a financial benefit.209 Preferred stock also entails financial benefits:
199. See id.
200. Id. at 92.
201. Id.
202. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.
2011) (stating that knowledge can be implied from investors communication to ventures).
203. See Arista Records v. Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d. 398, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
204. See Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also Arista Records, 784 F. Supp. 2d. at 425.
205. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 2007).
206. John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation In Venture Capital, 66
HASTINGS L.J. 133, 150 (2014); see also Bratton, supra note 183, at 929.
207. See Coyle & Green, supra note 206, at 150.
208. See MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
209. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM, 2009
WL 334022, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2009); see also Marshall, supra note 166 (considering
structuring any investment initially as a loan rather than equity).
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a preferred dividend and liquidation preference.210  Convertible debt simi-
larly may implicate a financial benefit insofar as it allows the creditor to
participate in the upside of the venture with little risk.211  Also, more com-
plex securities, such as bridge loans and warrants, often contain extra fi-
nancial benefits compared to more traditional investment contracts, which
may implicate the financial benefit prong of vicarious liability.212
VCs also may be subject to secondary liability by virtue of the overall
structure and disbursement of their investments.  VCs often structure their
investments in ways that provide incentives for entrepreneurs to advance
the company, while also allowing the VCs to jump ship if things start to go
sour.213  Structuring investments in this manner ostensibly means that VCs
have control over their ventures’ business models.214  Thus, this kind of
milestone-based staged financing may implicate both the facilitation and
right and ability to supervise prongs of secondary liability.215  Similarly,
vesting schedules are often viewed as control mechanisms, insofar as they
put strong incentives on entrepreneurs to continue with the venture and,
correspondingly, the business model approved by investors.216
iii. Control Provisions
Through the terms of their investments, VCs implement strong control
rights as a means both of protecting themselves and monitoring entrepre-
neurs.217  One of the most fundamental forms of control that VCs seek is
the board seat.218  As a legal matter, a venture’s board of directors runs
210. Coyle & Green, supra note 206, at 150.
211. See id. at 151. (“[C]onvertible notes may be converted into common stock or pre-
ferred stock, thereby giving the holder a chance to participate in the upside if a company
ultimately achieves a successful exit.”); see also Smith, supra note 182, at 148 (“[T]he use of
convertible securities allows a [VC] to salvage some value from failing ventures and usually
specifies that the [VC] may sell its shares at the same time and on the same terms as the
entrepreneurs.”).
212. See Arista Records, 784 F. Supp. 2d., at 435 (benefits associated with bridge loans
or warrant may create a causal connection between the infringing activity and investors); see
also FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 165, at 38 (“Since the bridge loan investor took addi-
tional risk, he generally gets either a discount on the price of the equity . . . or warrants that
effectively grant a discount . . . .”).
213. See Smith, supra note 182, at 141 (“Venture capitalists usually provide money to
entrepreneurs in stages to give entrepreneurs an incentive to advance the company.”); see
also id. at 148 (“[T]he structure of venture capital investments, particularly the staging of
such investments, provides performance incentives to entrepreneurs and allows venture capi-
talists to abandon investments that are failing.”).
214. Coyle & Green, supra note 206, at 151.
215. See Smith, supra note 182, at 141.
216. See FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 165, at 50 (“[M]any entrepreneurs view vest-
ing as a way for VCs to control them, their involvement, and their ownership in a company”).
217. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1193.
218. BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2 (“In negotiating the term sheet, the struggle for
power concerns who sits on the board.”); see also Coyle & Green, supra note 206, at 150.
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the business.219  In turn, if a board of directors is under the control of a
VC or group of VCs, the business is ostensibly “controlled” by the VC or
group of VCs.  Board control allows VCs to act in their own interest pro-
vided, however, that such action is in the interest of the company.220
Board control by investors is not unheard of; in fact, one empirical study
found VC board-control in 25% of cases,221 a percentage that is likely
higher in late-stage financings.222  Most early-stage boards have five board
members comprising two VCs, two entrepreneurs, and one outside repre-
sentative.223  Even the ability to add another VC member or to actively
influence the outside board member could constitute outright control of
the board.224  Contracting for visitation or attendance rights, which allow
VCs to attend but not vote at board meetings, might also imply knowledge
of infringing activity.225
Investor control of the board was the basis of UMG’s claim in Shelter
Capital Partners.  Citing the rather expansive interpretation of contribu-
tory liability found in Fonovisa, UMG claimed that three VCs made up
the majority of a five-person board of directors, which in turn “provided
the ‘site and facilities’ for direct infringement by wielding their majority
power to direct spending.”226  The claim failed because there was no alle-
gation that the investors acted in concert to form a majority, but the court
also pointed out that “joint control [is] not typically an element of contrib-
utory infringement.”227  Still, Shelter Capital Partners stands for the pro-
position that control of a DCI’s board, whether attributed to a single VC
or a syndicate acting in concert, can increase exposure to potential liabil-
ity.228  Giving up a board seat might be hard, but investors in DCIs are
advised to avoid maintaining control of the board or arranging for control
through a syndicate in a way that could be characterized by particularly
219. BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2. Among other things, a board of directors has the
power to make decisions regarding investment policy, dividend policy, exit strategy, or
amending the firm’s charter. See Bratton, supra note 183, at 926.
220. When acting on behalf of the company, directors are subject to fiduciary duties.
See Ibrahim, supra note 217, at 1193.
221. See Bratton, supra note 183, at 899 (“One or the other party, VC or E, has control
of the board in only 38% of their cases. In this subset, the VC takes control in two- thirds of
the cases . . .”).
222. See id.
223. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 165, at 62.
224. The ability to add another VC or to influence an outside board member may be
considered acting in concert to form control of the board. Cf. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shel-
ter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1032 (9th Cir. 2013).
225. See BARTLETT, supra note 9, § 9.2.
226. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d 1006, 1032, 1047 (9th
Cir. 2013).
227. Id. at 1032.
228. Gasner & Miksch, supra note 22 (“[T]here is a ‘safety in numbers’.”).
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aggressive plaintiffs as cooperation or conspiracy to control the
company.229
Voting rights are another control mechanism that may implicate liabil-
ity for investors.  One study has shown that VCs control a majority of the
votes in their ventures in over 70% of cases.230  VC voting control also
tends to be higher in ventures that have yet to become profitable.231
Therefore, because DCIs often take a long time to extract profits from
UGC,232 it is reasonable to assume that VCs investing in DCIs tend to
have more voting control.  The ability to vote on substantive business is-
sues likely constitutes a direct connection to the venture’s activities.233  To
the extent that VCs exercise their voting control to support business mod-
els that facilitate the distribution of infringing material, or fail to exercise
their voting control to prevent it, they may be considered to have “con-
trol” for purposes of vicarious liability.234  Similarly, voting may constitute
“engag[ing] in personal conduct that encourages or assists
infringement.”235
Protective provisions also raise liability concerns.  Protective provi-
sions constitute veto rights that investors have on certain actions by the
company and are common expectations in term sheet negotiations.236
Some provisions give VCs veto power over major transactions, such as
issuing dividends or selling the company.237  Other provisions provide
VCs with preemptive rights that help guarantee them consistent owner-
ship stakes.238  Protective provisions have the potential to implicate every
element of the secondary liability tests.  If VCs are vetoing business deci-
sions but the infringing activity is continuing, they will likely be seen as
facilitating and controlling the ventures sufficiently for both secondary lia-
bility tests.239
229. Id.
230. Bratton, supra note 183, at 899.
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Rob Lever, 10 Years Later, YouTube is a Hit But Faces Challenges, BUSI-
NESSINSIDER (Apr. 23, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-10-years-later-
youtube-is-a-hit-but-faces-challenges-2015-4 (discussing the fact that despite a $1.6 billion ac-
quisition by Google and cultural ubiquity, 90 percent of analysts agree that YouTube is not
profitable).
233. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007).
234. See id. at 802–03; see also MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005).
235. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
236. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 165, at 64.
237. Ibrahim, supra note 217, at 1193.
238. Coyle & Green, supra note 206, at 150.
239. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Services, 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that failure to stop infringing conduct from being distributed
constitutes substantial participation); see also Arista Records v. Lime Grp., 784 F. Supp. 2d.
398, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Control stakes can be conditioned upon ventures meeting, or failing to
meet, certain milestones.240  For example, a term sheet may provide that
VCs start out with limited control, but upon the failure to meet certain
benchmarks, a larger control stake “flips” back to them.241  Similarly,
sometimes VCs will start out with significant control that recedes as ven-
tures become more profitable.  VCs should negotiate these change-of-con-
trol provisions in the financing documents with the secondary liability tests
in mind.  Thus, VCs should avoid contracting for provisions that give them
the legal and practical ability to prevent infringing activity.  For example, if
a venture’s business model is sufficiently dependent on UGC, a change-of-
control provision contingent upon furthering that business model to a cer-
tain extent or reaching certain performance benchmarks could imply that
the VCs are “facilitating” infringement.
iv. Defensive Maneuvers
VCs can also use the venture financing negotiation process to imple-
ment defensive mechanisms that actively shift liability risk away from
them.  Indemnification provisions, for example, are powerful tools for in-
vestors to limit their liability exposure.  In Shapiro, the court stated that
secondary liability was “not unduly harsh or unfair as a third party could
have obtained an indemnity agreement.”242  VCs can obtain indemnifica-
tion on two separate levels: the individual (director) level and the fund
level. Director indemnification provisions are commonplace in term
sheets, whereas fund indemnification remains optional.243  Given the po-
tential for expansive DCI liability, VCs are strongly encouraged to negoti-
ate aggressively to obtain the venture’s agreement to indemnify it against
any and all losses suffered as a result of copyright infringement.244  Espe-
cially if a venture is operating in dangerous territory, they can expect their
bargaining position with regards to indemnification to be fairly weak.
Still, investors should keep an eye out for carve-outs that block indemnifi-
240. See LEE R. PETILLON ET AL, REPRESENTING START-UP COMPANIES § 7.12 (Supp.
2015) (“One of the thorniest issues in negotiating start-up financing arrangements is a provi-
sion for change of control in the event that certain performance benchmarks (e.g., successful
development of a prototype, commencement of production, customer acceptance of the
product or turning profitable) are not met, or the company defaults in its obligations under
the financing agreement.”).
241. BARTLETT, supra note 9, at § 9.2 (“Further, the term sheet may provide for a con-
trol ‘flip,’ meaning that the investors are content with a minority of the board as long as
everything is going well; they succeed to outright control of the board when and as the com-
pany gets in trouble, allowing them to tie a can to the founder.”); see also PETILLON ET AL.,
supra note 240 (“Often venture investors will require that the control of the company, nor-
mally vested in the founder/management group, switch and vest in the investor group upon
occurrence of such a triggering event.”).
242. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
243. FELD & MENDELSON, supra note 165, at 93.
244. Foley, supra note 133, at 127.
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cation if investors “knowingly” supported or encouraged the
infringement.245
Representations and warranties are also a crucial way to shift liability
risk away from the investors and towards the financing targets.  In the case
of unknown infringement, prospective investors should obtain representa-
tions and warranties from financing targets specifying that the target both
has no knowledge of copyright infringement and that they do not intend to
infringe in the future.246  A warranty of no knowledge can help investors
avoid liability under a contributory infringement claim by providing evi-
dence that they did not have actual knowledge of infringing activity.247  In
the case of known infringing activity, the VC should demand a representa-
tion of full disclosure of all known infringements.248  Ideally, the investors
would have full knowledge of any infringing activity from their due dili-
gence process, but they should still obtain a contractual representation
that the financing target has done its own thorough due diligence to deter-
mine whether it is actively contributing to the infringement of third party
copyrights.249
Avoiding knowledge of infringing activity is a particularly thorny issue
for VCs in negotiating financing contracts.  On the one hand, it is reasona-
ble to say that VCs should minimize overt acknowledgments of infringing
activity prior to investing.  However, VCs have a strong incentive to be
fully aware of infringing activity to help encourage monitoring and notice
systems in order to prevent future liability issues from flaring up.  If a
venture is in a position to make changes to its business strategy or product
design to reduce liability, VCs should encourage that.  Additionally, willful
blindness of infringing activity constitutes knowledge for purposes of con-
tributory liability.250  A VC that has a subjective belief of infringing activ-
ity occurring and then chooses to avoid learning more about such
infringement while moving forward with an investment would be consid-
ered willfully blind.251  However, negotiating for less control rights in the
financing documents may reduce the likelihood of a finding of constructive
knowledge.  Thus, VCs should understand that affirmatively avoiding
awareness of infringing activity is likely not a solution; rather VCs should
get representations and warranties from entrepreneurs addressing known
and unknown infringement.  VCs can instead rely on reduced control to
245. Blevins, supra note 105, at 1855.
246. See Marshall, supra note 166.
247. See Proctor, supra note 172, at 230.
248. Id. at 229–30.
249. Foley, supra note 133, at 126–27.
250. Luvdarts v. AT&T Mobility, 710 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2013).
251. See id.
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limit their liability and should encourage notification and monitoring sys-
tems to help establish good faith.252
Insurance is also a powerful protection device.  In the same way that it
relied on the availability of indemnification, the court in Shapiro justified
vicarious liability in situations where a defendant could easily have ob-
tained insurance.253  VCs are strongly encouraged to obtain insurance cov-
erage for copyright infringement liability prior to engaging in financing
transactions.254  Insurance coverage should be on multiple levels: the com-
pany level, the fund level, and personal level.  Also, VCs should make sure
the coverage is broad enough to cover known and unknown copyright in-
fringement liability as well as prior infringement.  Potential investors
should be aware, however, that insurance can tie their hands: having ade-
quate insurance may make it more difficult to turn down settlement offers
from plaintiffs with weak claims.255
Defensive mechanisms such as insurance are useful, but they can only
do so much in situations of expansive liability.  Expansive insurance cover-
age may worry limited partners, indemnification agreements will be use-
less against ESVs that have little capital, and representations and
warranties will provide little protection when infringing activity is a known
and fundamental aspect of the company’s business model.  In the clear
cases, then, such as Napster and YouTube, the best answer is not to in-
vest.256  In most cases, however, the aforementioned transactional maneu-
vers should encourage VCs to move forward.
v. Post-Investment Conduct
Once the decision to invest is made and the term sheet negotiations are
complete, VCs should continue to adjust their conduct to help reduce the
likelihood of finding a causal connection between them and infringing ac-
tivity.257  VCs should be especially cautious in all communications with
entrepreneurs to avoid acknowledging infringing activity.258  VCs should
also encourage prompt action in response to notices of infringement and
encourage DMCA compliance.259  It is equally important for VCs to stay
up to date on the venture’s business, monitoring product and business
strategy changes so as to be aware when such changes increase or decrease
252. See John T. Williams & Craig W. Mandell, Winning the Battle, But Losing the War:
Why the Second Circuit’s Decision in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. Is a Landmark
Victory For Internet Service Providers, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 235, 274 (2013).
253. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
254. See Foley, supra note 133, at 128.
255. See Carrier, supra note 6, at 937.
256. See generally Foley, supra note 133, at 126.
257. See Proctor, supra note 172, at 230.
258. See Foley, supra note 133, at 126.
259. See id.; see also Latham, supra note 19, at 9.
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liability concerns.260  For example, the more UGC becomes integrated
with a venture’s strategy and revenue model, the more likely that liability
will exist.261  VCs should also take part in a certain degree of legal posi-
tioning.  They should work with counsel to stay on top of legal develop-
ments regarding investor and DCI liability and should seek advice as to
how to best frame their conduct as independent of infringing activity,
which may help a court determine that the VC is too tangential a party to
be held liable.262
V. CONCLUSION
The continuing growth of UGC presents enormous opportunity for
VCs. Unfortunately, as the prevalence of UGC grows so does the prospect
for copyright infringement liability.  Investors are not immune from this
liability, and current precedent makes the scope of investor liability con-
spicuously unclear.  But the lack of legal clarity should not act as a deter-
rent to future investment.  The traditional tests of secondary liability can
form the basis of cautious term-sheet negotiating which can shield inves-
tors from implicating themselves in infringing conduct.  This approach will
help encourage continued investment and innovation in UGC, and will
avoid repeating the ramifications of Napster.
260. See Marshall, supra note 166 (“[I]t will be equally important to continually monitor
product changes and business strategies . . . .”).
261. See Ginsburg, supra note 21, at 579 (“The more infringement becomes integrated
into the innovator’s business plan, however, the less likely the entrepreneur is (or should be)
to persuade a court of the neutrality of its venture.”).
262. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C 00-1369 MHP, 2001 WL 36593841,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2001).
